Michigan Law Review
Volume 52

Issue 7

1954

EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE-RIGHT OF THIRD PERSON TO ASSERT
PRIVILEGE AS TO ACCIDENT REPORT MADE CONFIDENTIAL BY
STATUTE
Richard W. Young S.Ed.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Common Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the
Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard W. Young S.Ed., EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE-RIGHT OF THIRD PERSON TO ASSERT PRIVILEGE AS TO
ACCIDENT REPORT MADE CONFIDENTIAL BY STATUTE, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1061 (1954).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol52/iss7/9

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1954]

1061

RECENT DECISIONS

EvmBNCB-PRIVILEcn-RmHT oP

TBIBD PBRsoN

TO

AsSBRT PBIVILBGB AS

MADn CoNPIDBNTIAL BY STATUTE*-Plaintiff brought
a negligence action for injuries sustained when the automobile in which she
was a passenger collided with that operated by the defendant. Defendant
questioned a police officer, who had filed the accident report, concerning
statements made to him by the driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff
was riding. The trial court pennitted this testimony over the plaintiff's
objection that these statements were privileged under an Iowa statute purporting to make written accident reports confidential and inadmissible in
evidence.1 On appeal after a verdict was returned in favor of the defendant,
held, reversed. The statute can be the basis for objection by one who is not
a party to the report. The statutory prohibition of the accident report as
evidence does more than create a personal privilege; it is not for the sole
benefit of the party reporting but is for the benefit of the public at large.
Sprague 11. Brodus, (Iowa 1953) 60 N.W. (2d) 850.
TO ACCIDENT R:sPORT

"' For discussion of a much different judicial attitude in another accident report case,
seep. 1063 infra.-Ed.
1 Iowa Code (1950) §321.271 provides: "All accident reports shall be in writing and
the written report shall be filed without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall
be for the confidential use of the deparbnent. • • • A written report filed with the department shall not be admissible in or used in evidence in any civil case arising out of the facts
on which the report is based."
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Statutes requmng the filing of accident reports often contain provisions
that such reports shall not be admissible in litigation arising out of the facts
on which the report is based.2 An analogous privilege existed at common
law for communications by informers -to the government, based on a policy that
persons possessing information needed by the government for the conduct of
its functions should be accorded an assurance of privacy in order to induce
disclosures.3 While the Iowa statute in terms makes only the written report
inadmissible, it has consistently been construed to mean that statements made
to the officer by the reporting motorist are privileged as well.4 The court in
the principal case extends the privilege even further in holding that any
person is· entitled to invoke the statutory protection. 5 The rationale warranting
suppression of evidence derived from accident reporting is said to rest on the
clear legislative purpose of enabling the government to secure statistical data
as a basis for safety recommendations. 6 It is sometimes stated that only the
communicant can assert the privilege accorded a confidential communication, 7
but this rule may not control in the area of privileges which were unknown
to the common law. Since rules of nondisclosure or privilege covering matters
required by law to ·be reported to administrative officials are essentially statutory in origin, it would seem that courts must look to the statutes themselves
for the dimensions of the privilege thus created.8 Where the statute clearly
2 58 AM. Jun., Witnesses §533 (1948); 165 A.L.R. 1315 (1946). Many states have
adopted literally or in substance the Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Act §16 (1930),
which so provides. See text of accident reporting provision and list of statutes in 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2377, n. 3 (1940; 1953 Supp.).
3 8 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2377, p. 761 (1940): " .•• many situations exist
where the information can best be obtained only from the person himself whose affairs
are desired to be known by the Government. An attempt to do so by mere compulsion
might be tedious and ineffective. And where the ultimate purpose to be served is administrative, and not penal, it may well be that the Government can afford to promise secrecy
in respect to purposes penal or litigious, as the price for readily achieving its administrative
purpose when it demands a report of the truth."
4 Vandell v. Roewe, 232 Iowa 896, 6 N.W. (2d) 295 (1942); Bachelder v. Woodside,
233 Iowa 967, 9 N.W. (2d) 464 (1943); State v. Williams, 238 Iowa 838, 28 N.W. (2d)
514 (1947). Contra: Ritter v. Nieman, 329 ill. App. 163, 67 N.E. (2d) 417 (1946);
Rockwood v. Pierce, 235 Minn. 519, 51 N.W. (2d) 670 (1952), noted 36 MINN. L.
REv. 540 (1952) and 26 TEMPLE L.Q. 77 (1952).
5 Stevens v. Duke, (Fla. 1949) 42 S. (2d) 361, and Henry v. Condit, 152 Ore.
348, 53 P. (2d) 722 (1936), relied on in the principal case, seem to recognize inferentially the right of a third person to assert the privilege, but in these cases a privity relation
existed between the persons reporting and those objecting to the use of the report. in
evidence and the opinions did not discuss this question.
6 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2377, p. 766 (1940): "Here the main object is
to investigate conditions and causes with a view to future administrative action; hence the
State can afford to abdicate the use of such reports for purposes of punishment or of
private litigation, in case the facts reported reveal a legal liability or a commercial secret
on the part of the person reporting." Quoted with approval in Lowen v. Pates, 219 Minn.
566 at 569, 18 N.W. (2d) 455 (1945), and relied on in the principal case.
7 70 C.J., Witnesses §619 (1935); 34 KY. L.J. 213 (1946); 8 W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE,
3d ed., §§2321, 2386 (1940). See generally 30 CoL. L. REv. 686 (1930); 22 CALIF. L.
REv. 667 (1934).
8 Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., (D.C. Conn. 1940) 1
F.R.D. 190; 165 A.L.R. 1308 (1946); 8 W1cMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2377 (1940).
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and unequivocally forbids a given disclosure, this must be given full effect
as judicial construction is appropriate only to resolve ambiguity.9 But a clear
legislative mandate should be necessary to justify the suppression of pertinent
testimony on the ground of privilege,10 and any provision operating to limit
the scope of judicial inquiry by removing evidence from the court's consideration and affecting the substantial rights of litigants should be cautiously
applied. 11 By permitting strangers to the communication to assert the privilege,
the Iowa court here applies a literal interpretation of the accident reporting
statute and ignores the common law antecedents which underlie the recognition
of privileged communications. The court instead treats the statute as a mandatory disqualification of the accident report and the statements on which it
is based.12 Although the court faced a sweeping statutory prohibition, it
would appear that it was not precluded from weighing the benefits accruing
from nondisclosure against the injury to the correct disposal of the litigation, 13
thus possibly avoiding some of the onerous effect of the provision in excluding
material evidence. It may be questioned whether strangers to the communication constituting the accident report need be accorded the right to raise the
question of its confidential nature as a necessary means of inducing persons
to make such reports. Had the court in the principal case made this inquiry,
it might well have denied the right of the plaintiff to invoke the privilege of
nondisclosure.

Richard W. Young, S.Ed.

Hickok v. Margolis, 221 Minn. 480, 22 N.W. (2d) 850 (1946).
v. Orange Realty, Inc., 97 N.H. 497, 92 A. (2d) 656 (1952). See also
Hawthorne v. Delano, 183 Iowa 444, 167 N.W. 196 (1918); 165 A.L.R. 1308 (1946).
11 58 AM. Jun., Witnesses §533 (1948).
12 See 20 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 76 at 79 (1951); McCormick, "The Scope of Privilege
in the Law of Evidence," 16 TEx. L. REv. 447 (1938).
13 Professor Wigmore has established four fundamental conditions necessary to the
establishment of a privilege against disclosure of communications. One of these is: " •••
(4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications
must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation." 8
WxGMORE, EvmENcB, 3d ed., §2285, p. 531 (1940).
9

10 Marceau

